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The aim of this study was to investigate cognitive inhibition in first episode 
major depressive disorder (MDD) at a one-year follow-up. Firty-three participants were 
assessed on the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Adult Version 
(BRIEF-A) and the Color Word Interference Test (CWIT) one year after first being 
diagnosed with MDD. Previous studies of the same sample have shown that the patient 
group, especially those who relapsed, had impaired inhibition performance as measured 
by the CWIT, even after remission. This study investigated self-reported inhibition, as 
well as general executive functioning, measured by BRIEF-A. The patient group (n=26) 
reported more problems with inhibition and general executive functioning than controls 
(n=27), despite remission from other depressive symptoms. CWIT inhibition scores did 
not correlate with BRIEF inhibition, but did correlate with the BRIEF Global Executive 
Composite. There was no significant difference between the BRIEF-A scores of those 
who had relapsed and those who had not. These results support previous findings of 
persistent deficits after remission, but it is possible that the two measures should be 
treated as complimentary, not interchangeable, measures of inhibition in MDD. 
Inhibition has promise in the study of MDD, but needs to be carefully defined.  
  






Målet med denne studien var å undersøke kognitiv inhibisjon ved depressiv 
lidelse ett år etter første episode. Femtitre deltagere ble undersøkt med Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Function—Adult Version (BRIEF-A) og Color Word 
Interference Test (CWIT). Tidligere studier med samme utvalg har vist at deprimerte, 
og spesielt de som opplevde tilbakefall i løpet av det påfølgende året etter første 
episode, hadde dårligere skåre enn kontrolldeltagere på inhibisjon målt med CWIT, selv 
etter remisjon. Denne studien undersøkte selvrapportert inhibisjon, i tillegg til 
selvrapportert eksekutiv-funksjon mer generelt, med BRIEF-A. Pasientgruppen (n = 26) 
rapporterte flere problemer med inhibisjon og generell eksekutiv-funksjon enn 
kontrollgruppen (n = 27), på tross av remisjon fra øvrige symptomer. CWIT-skårer 
korrelerte ikke med inhibisjons-skåre fra BRIEF-A, men korrelerte med det generelle 
målet på eksekutiv-fungering. Det var ingen forskjell mellom skårene til de som hadde 
tilbakefall, og de som ikke hadde tilbakefall på BRIEF-A. Resultatene støtter tidligere 
funn om varig kognitiv svekkelse etter remisjon, men det kan være at de to forskjellige 
målene bør behandles som ulike og komplementære mål på inhibisjon ved depresjon. 
Inhibisjon ser ut til å være et relevant fokusområde i studier av depresjon, men bør 
defineres mer presist. 
  




Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a debilitating illness with an estimated 
lifetime prevalence of 11.1%-14.6% globally (Bromet et al., 2011). It is associated with 
significant negative consequences in a number of areas, including occupational 
performance (Baune et al., 2010; Preiss et al., 2009), social functioning (Segrin, 2000) 
and quality of life (Gostautas, Pranckeviciene, & Matoniene, 2006), as well as being 
linked to morbidity and mortality for a number of diseases (Lépine & Briley, 2011). 
MDD also constitutes a large economic burden to society in the form of direct and 
indirect healthcare costs (Sobocki, Jönsson, Angst, & Rehnberg, 2006), lower work 
productivity even after remission (Adler et al., 2006), and a reduced workforce due to 
disablement (Ferrari et al., 2013). Depression is considered the second largest cause of 
disability world wide (Ferrari et al., 2013). The burden on the individual and on society 
is compounded by the high rate of relapse and chronicity of depression; more than 75% 
will have more than one episode (Boland & Keller, 2009), with about 50% relapsing 
within the first two years of an initial episode (Mueller et al., 1999). Naturally, 
mechanisms involved in the development of depression, in causing related disability 
and increasing risk of relapse are of great interest. Cognitive impairment has been 
associated with these different aspects of depression, and may possibly serve as a link 
between them. 
There is broad consensus that depression involves cognitive impairment in 
important domains such as memory, attention, psychomotor- and processing-speed, and 
problem solving (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Baune, Fuhr, Air, & Hering, 
2014; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Lee, Hermens, Porter, & Redoblado-Hodge, 2012; 
Papakostas, 2014). Previous studies have indicated that deficits in executive function 
are present in the first episode of depression, specifically impairments on the measures 




of inhibition and semantic fluency (Schmid & Hammar, 2013a). These executive 
function deficits were found to persist despite symptom recovery after one year (Schmid 
& Hammar, 2013b). Impaired performance during the acute phase on an inhibition task 
with additional demands on cognitive flexibility was found to differentiate between 
depressed participants who relapsed within a year and those who did not (Schmid & 
Hammar, 2013b). Thus, poor performance on this inhibition measure may reflect a 
cognitive impairment linked to the risk of relapse in MDD.  
 The current study further examined the role of inhibition in depression. The 
measure of inhibition in the study that found persistent impairment (Schmid & Hammar, 
2013b) was the Color Word Interference Test (CWIT) from the Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). The present study looked 
at the self-reported inhibition deficits for this same sample on the Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Function—Adult Version (BRIEF-A; Roth, Isquith, & Gioia, 
2005). It aimed to investigate whether impairments detectable in controlled testing 
environments are associated with comparable problems in daily life, addressing the 
unity of the inhibition construct as well as its utility in the study of depression 
vulnerability, disability and relapse. There are a number of conceptual and 
methodological obstacles to defining and investigating the presence, type and impact of 
cognitive impairment, but increasing evidence indicates that it may be a central part of 
understanding the depression cycle (Austin et al., 2001; Baune et al., 2014; Hammar & 
Årdal, 2009; Jaeger, Berns, Uzelac, & Davis-Conway, 2006). 
Cognitive Impairment in Depression 
The subjective experience of depression frequently involves reduced mental 
acuity, articulated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV 




(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) as “diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or more indecisiveness” (p.356). It is also generally accepted that cognitive 
content such as negative automatic thoughts and schemas play an important role in 
depression (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). Biased information processing in the 
domains of attention, appraisal and memory are well established as characteristics of the 
depressive cycle (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Many 
studies have indicated that individuals with depression may be more vulnerable to these 
kinds of biased information processing, particularly when experiencing stress or 
negative affect (Ingram, 2003; Scher et al., 2005). However, research has suggested that 
affective disorders are associated with impairments in a number of important cognitive 
domains that exceed what can be explained by the affective symptoms and stress-related 
biases in information processing (Preiss et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2005). 
Suboptimal functioning of central cognitive processes may constitute an important 
source of vulnerability in depression. 
There are a number of reasons why cognitive impairment in depression is of 
interest. The proposed roles for cognitive impairment include (a) a link with 
psychosocial disability; (b) a link with illness characteristics and outcomes; and (c) a 
vulnerability to depressive episodes. Relevant in all these areas is the relative stability 
and independence of cognitive impairment from other symptoms. These elements will 
be discussed in turn before exploring whether executive functions, and more 
specifically inhibition, is a good way to conceptualize this deficit.  
Psychosocial disability. It has been shown in a variety of psychiatric conditions, 
including depression, that neuropsychological deficits impede life functioning in many 
areas, including, work, education, family relationships and other social relations 




(Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Jaeger et al., 2006). Some studies have indicated that 
cognitive impairment may be the largest source of psychosocial disability for people 
with MDD by impairing occupational performance (McIntyre et al., 2013; Preiss et al., 
2009). Both self-reported and objectively measured cognitive impairments have been 
found to be unique and strong predictors of disability in MDD, particularly in the area 
of physical disability, which involves impediments to physical activity, daily routines, 
and hobbies (Naismith, Longley, Scott, & Hickie, 2007). 
It is not just during acute depressive episodes that MDD has been associated 
with reduced psychosocial functioning. Judd, Paulus, Wells, and Rapaport (1996) found 
that the disability for subsyndromal depression was equal to that of clinical depression, 
implying a role for a more persistent disadvantage. Impaired cognitive functioning may 
be persistent, occur independently of affective symptoms, and contribute to 
psychosocial disability beyond the effects of other symptoms. There are indications that 
cognitive symptoms do not always subside at the same rate as other symptoms, and 
might persist even after remission from MDD (Austin et al., 2001; Baune et al., 2010; 
Bhardwaj, Wilkinson, Srivastava, & Sharma, 2010; Bortolato, Carvalho, & McIntyre, 
2014; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Neu et al., 2005; Reischies & Neu, 2000), which could 
mean that the detrimental consequences for daily social, occupational and academic 
activities continue even after the other symptoms are reduced. Sarapas, Shankman, 
Harrow, & Faull (2013) have reported that cognitive performance could predict social 
functioning for people with depression after 18 years, even when controlling for 
baseline social functioning and symptoms of depression. Jaeger et al. (2006) found that 
neuropsychological impairments during hospitalization for MDD predicted disability in 
life functioning 6 months later. Not all studies have found the persistence of cognitive 




symptoms after remission (Biringer et al., 2005; Neu et al., 2005), so causes of these 
discrepancies warrant further research.  
It is possible that these psychosocial consequences in themselves contribute to 
increased stress and persistent illness, for example through less social support and thus 
reliance on less effective coping strategies (Jaeger et al., 2006). Reduced cognitive 
function may, however, also impair the ability to self-regulate, cope and problem solve 
more directly (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). More knowledge on the topic could help 
determine whether interventions aimed at remediating or living with reduced cognitive 
function are useful ways to reduce disability in MDD.  
Outcomes and illness characteristics. There are indications that, in addition to 
disability, cognitive impairment is correlated with other important MDD illness 
characteristics, such as chronicity, the number of relapses and long-term average 
severity (Bhardwaj et al., 2010; Buist-Bouwman et al., 2008; Sarapas et al., 2013; 
Fennig & Mottes, 2002). In a recent review of the literature, Papakostas (2014) found 
multiple and consistent indications that cognitive deficits were associated with earlier 
onset, longer duration and impediment to treatment and functional recovery. Schmid 
and Hammar (2013b) found that in first episode depression, cognitive functioning was 
related to the risk of relapse within a year. Some exceptions do exist; Reischies and Neu 
(2000) found no such correlation between cognitive functioning and duration of disease 
or number of episodes, despite persistence of impairment after remission and a 
relatively high median age of the participants (Md = 53.7 years). Determining when and 
how cognitive functioning is impaired in depression, and how it relates to illness 
characteristics, may offer valuable insights into the heterogeneity of MDD outcomes. 




Vulnerability to depressive episodes. The association between poorer cognitive 
functioning and depression has been demonstrated repeatedly, but the exact nature of 
this relationship is complex. Three commonly cited hypotheses will be discussed 
briefly, as any possible causality is central to understanding the role of cognitive 
impairment in depression. The relationship between cognitive dysfunction and 
depression has been variously posited as a mood-dependent effect, a detrimental 
consequence of depression, or a more stable trait that constitutes a predisposition to 
depression.  
Cognitive impairment as mood-dependent effect. It has been suggested that 
mild residual affective symptoms could be a factor contributing to apparent cognitive 
deficits in remission for bipolar patients (Clark, Iversen, & Goodwin, 2002). Scheurich 
et al. (2008) argued for a motivational origin of cognitive impairment in major 
depression, related to mood, task specific self-efficacy, and interest. However, 
motivation and effort have not always been found to co-vary with the symptoms (Jaeger 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, after controlling for mood effects and for 
hypercorticolaemia, the impairments on a number of cognitive tests were still 
significant for MDD and bipolar disorder (Gorwood, Corruble, Falissard, & Goodwin, 
2008; Jaeger et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2005). For remitted patients, it has been 
reported that the concurrent levels of depressive symptoms were unrelated to cognitive 
impairment (Preiss et al., 2009; Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). Thus residual mood-
dependent effects do not appear to explain all cognitive difficulties. 
Cognitive impairment as a consequence of detrimental effects on the brain 
caused by depression, possibly resulting from neurotoxic effects. There is some 
research suggesting that depression has a detrimental effect on cognitive function, 




specifically the fact that impairments have been found to correlate with the number of 
previous episodes (Kessing, 1998), get worse with each episode (Baune et al., 2010) and 
to correlate with the duration of the illness (Elgamal, Denburg, Marriott, & MacQueen, 
2010; Gorwood et al., 2008; Sweeney, Kmiec, & Kupfer, 2000; Thompson et al., 2005). 
In a longitudinal study, past but not current symptom severity correlated with cognitive 
deficits, and cognitive impairment did not fluctuate with the other symptoms (Sarapas et 
al., 2013).  
The detrimental effects of depression might involve endocrine and autonomic 
changes. One common finding in depression is hypersecretion of corticotropin-releasing 
factor (CRF) and consequently hyperactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenocortical (HPA) axis and sympathic activation (Arborelius, Owens, Plotsky, & 
Nemeroff, 1999; Gillespie & Nemeroff, 2005; Nemeroff, 1988). A review by Schlosser, 
Wolf and Wingenfeld (2011) found moderate support for the hypothesis that HPA-
related changes are linked to cognitive performance, as 14 out of 20 studies reported 
significant correlations between these. Central to the dysregulation of the HPA is an 
excess of corticosteroids, which have the potential to cause neural damage and to 
negatively impact cognitive and affective function (Herbert et al., 2006). This, however, 
does not mean that depressive episodes themselves cause this damage. HPA-function, 
commonly linked to stress, may be influenced by genetic factors as well as life events 
(Herbert et al., 2006). In addition, cognitive impairment has been reported as early as 
the first episode in MDD (Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Lee et al., 2012), indicating that not 
all cognitive impairment can be explained simply by the detrimental effects of long term 
illness.  




Cognitive impairment as the reflection of a trait or other vulnerability to 
depression. In addition to being reported in first episode MDD (Hammar & Årdal, 
2009; Lee et al., 2012), some aspects of cognitive dysfunction might even predate the 
first episode, and thus serve as a predictive marker of depression. Compromised 
performance on cognitive tests has been demonstrated three years before depression 
develops (Airaksinen, Wahlin, Forsell, & Larsson, 2007) and with participants who are 
not yet depressed but genetically at risk for depression (Mannie, Barnes, Bristow, 
Harmer, & Cowen, 2009). Neuroanatomical abnormalities associated with recurrent 
depression have been found in first episode MDD (Lee et al., 2012), further supporting 
the hypothesis that some dysfunction may predate any potential long-term effects of 
depression. Performance in a number of cognitive domains has proven stable over six 
years for depressed patients (Sarapas, Shankman, Harrow, & Goldberg, 2012). It has 
been suggested that cognitive impairment in affective disorders are the result of a trait-
level dysfunction in neural circuitry (Smith, Muir, & Blackwood, 2006; Thompson et 
al., 2005). This could represent a stable and possibly heritable (Smith et al., 2006) 
vulnerability to depression.  
A combination. The nature of the relationship between cognitive impairment 
and depression could depend on several variables. One of these may be way in which 
cognitive dysfunction is measured and defined. There are some indications that some 
cognitive processes are only temporarily compromised in acute episodes, whereas 
others might represent longer-lasting traits (Douglas & Porter, 2009; Huang, 2009; Lee 
et al., 2012). In a meta-analysis of cognitive function in first episode MDD by Lee et al. 
(2012), psychomotor speed and memory were described as state-dependent, whereas 
attention and executive function were more persistent. This was also reported by 




Douglas and Porter (2009). Huang (2009) has found poor executive and motor 
functioning to persist after remission, but not memory and attention.  
The causality could also be reciprocal and complex. Longitudinal research 
reveals this complexity better than crossectional studies. For instance; cognitive 
measures at baseline predictive of psychosocial functioning 18 years later beyond the 
effect of illness severity (Sarapas et al., 2013), but cognitive functioning at 26 years was 
also strongly associated with average illness severity retrospectively (Sarapas et al., 
2012). It thus seems that cognitive functioning at baseline might at least be predictive of 
a more debilitating form of depression. Regardless of the causal relationships, 
assessment of cognitive function may therefore be useful for early screening (Jaeger et 
al., 2006; Sarapas et al., 2012). It is possible that an initial cognitive vulnerability may 
be exacerbated by repeated depressive episodes. Understanding the causal relationship 
might also require taking into account shared influences, such as HPA-dysregulation 
(Arborelius et al., 1999; Schlosser et al., 2011).  
Divergence due to Heterogeneity 
One reason for the disagreements over the role of cognitive deficits in 
depression might be variations in methodology and the populations studied. Treating all 
MDD patients as one group has led to contradictory findings (Hammar & Årdal, 2009; 
McClintock, Husain, Greer, & Cullum, 2010). In order to further assess the independent 
impact of cognitive impairment, its effects needs to be differentiated from correlated 
characteristics of the illness, such as duration and number of episodes, depression 
subtype and other factors that have an impact on functioning (McIntyre et al., 2013). 
Numerous other variables have also been found to predict the degree to which cognitive 
impairment is associated with depression, such as comorbidity, age at onset, premorbid 




intelligence and education level, current age, gender and profession (Elgamal et al., 
2010; Gorwood et al., 2008; Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Kessler, 2003; Levin, 
Heller, Mohanty, Herrington, & Miller, 2007; McIntyre et al., 2013). These variables 
have additionally been reported to interact; as with for instance cognitive flexibility, 
which correlated with more severe illness for unipolar but not bipolar depression 
(Sarapas et al., 2012). The present study used a well-defined population of outpatients 
experiencing first episode MDD with little or no co-morbidity. Even in well-defined 
populations, however, studying different parts of cognitive functioning, or using 
different tasks, might still lead to divergent conclusions on the role of cognitive 
impairment in depression (Jaeger et al., 2006). Identifying what tasks are sensitive to 
dysfunction in MDD is therefore essential. 
Identifying which Specific Deficits are Associated with Depression 
Attempting to describe the cognitive impairment more precisely has yielded 
widely varying results. Some of the domains that have been frequently linked to 
depression are: memory, problem solving, psychomotor speed and executive functions 
(Austin et al., 2001; Baune et al., 2014; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Lee et al., 2012). 
However, in all these areas, studies are also reported which have found no impairment, 
and dividing each domain further into components such as working memory versus 
episodic memory, or cued versus free recall yields further discrepant findings (Austin et 
al., 2001; Baune et al., 2014; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Lee et al., 2012). It might 
therefore be that crucial variables still remain unaccounted for in much of the previous 
literature that confound the question of which specific cognitive deficits are associated 
with depression. Characteristics of the study participants such as comorbidity, 
depression subtype, age, education, presence of psychosis, symptom severity and 




medication have all been reported to influence what type of cognitive impairment that is 
found (Castaneda, Tuulio-Henriksson, Marttunen, Suvisaari, & Lönnqvist, 2008; 
Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Jaeger et al., 2006; Kizilbash, Vanderploeg, & Curtiss, 2002; 
Lee et al., 2012; Levin et al., 2007), suggesting that various cognitive processes might 
be differentially associated with depression for dissimilar groups. Using small and 
differing test batteries may also make comparison between studies problematic, 
potentially leading to divergent conclusions (Jaeger et al., 2006). 
Executive Functions 
Despite these differences, there have also been frequent overlaps between 
findings. Executive functioning is one of the areas that have been often researched in 
relation to MDD, and results on a wide range of executive tasks have been associated 
with depression (Baune et al., 2010; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Ottowitz, Dougherty, & 
Savage, 2002; Snyder, 2013; Stordal et al., 2004). The term executive function is used to 
describe higher-order cognitive control-mechanisms involved in the regulation of 
thought, emotion and behavior (Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; Miyake 
et al., 2000; Roth et al., 2005). Executive functions coordinate, monitor and modulate 
cognitive subprocesses to enable a flexible approach to varying demands and conditions 
(Miyake et al., 2000).  
Examples of proposed executive function tasks include the ability to select and 
redirect attentional focus; make, select and switch strategies; monitor performance; 
utilize feedback; deploy cognitive resources efficiently; and inhibit inappropriate 
responses (P. Anderson, 2002; Baune et al., 2010; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Basic 
cognitive skills such as attention, memory, language and perception are utilized in order 
to produce complex, abstract and creative thought and behavior (Alvarez & Emory, 




2006; Swanson, 2005), making executive functions essential parts of a wide range of 
activities, including problem solving; decision making; goal-directed thought and 
behavior; planning; and self-regulation (Miyake et al., 2000; Rose, Feldman, & 
Jankowski, 2011; van der Plas, Crone, van den Wildenberg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2009). 
When executive functions are operating successfully; thoughts, emotions and behaviors 
are internally generated to a larger extent, and less stimulus-driven and automatic 
(Miyake et al., 2000), allowing for our actions to be consistent with internal goals in a 
complex and changing environment (Waskom et al., 2014).  
In general, executive functions are thought to be specifically relevant in effortful 
tasks that require novel or non-routine processing (Shallice, 1988), and when theres a 
conflict between competing responses (Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998). It has therefore 
been posited that they are especially important in less defined or constrained tasks, 
where the participant needs to direct attention to relevant material and inhibit other 
elements (Lezak, 1982).  
Executive Functions and Research on Cognitive Impairment  
Executive functions might be of particular interest when studying cognitive 
impairment in MDD for a number of reasons. One reason is that executive functions are 
likely to be important to a large number of tasks in everyday life as well as in controlled 
settings (P. Anderson, 2002; Baune et al., 2010; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Waskom, Kumaran, Gordon, Rissman, & Wagner, 2014). 
A deficit in this area is therefore plausible as an explanation for varied and numerous 
problems. Hertel (1997) has suggested that the memory problems experienced in 
depression are caused by poor cognitive control. Gotlib & Joormann (2010) ruled out 
memory problems in one group of depressed individuals by structuring the task in a way 




that reduced the opportunity for rumination; a process linked to executive control 
according to the authors. The fact that task characteristics, such as structure, have this 
impact on executive function performance could explain some of the variability 
previously discussed in cognitive function-results. It may be interesting to review the 
task structure in studies where results have contradicted many previous findings. For 
instance, in the study by Reischies and Neu (2000), in which illness duration or number 
of episodes did not correlate with cognitive dysfunction, the authors made a point of 
using short tasks.  
Some cognitive function tasks might be placing greater demands on higher-level 
processes in charge of organizing and planning, in other words executive functions. In a 
review article, Castaneda et al. (2008) reported that in relation to depression, evidence 
of deficient executive functioning is more consistently found than problems with 
memory and learning. Comparisons of multiple tests in comprehensive test batteries 
have shown indications of executive dysfunction even when performance was 
unimpeded in a range of other domains (Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Porter, Gallagher, 
Thompson, & Young, 2003).  
Executive Functions and Depression 
Executive functioning has been liked to affective regulation and behavioral 
control (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), and might consequently be a good candidate for 
exploring the relationship between cognition and affective disorders. The inability to 
disengage attention from negative material has been seen in depression (Beevers & 
Carver, 2003; Compton, Heller, Banich, Palmieri, & Miller, 2000), as have problems 
manipulating and discarding negative material from working memory (Gotlib & 




Joormann, 2010). In people prone to rumination, impairments have been shown on tasks 
measuring executive function (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010).  
Poor executive function might also be a good candidate for exploring disability 
in depression. Performance on tests of executive function has directly predicted daily 
functioning for a range of populations, including those with dysexecutive syndrome 
(Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998), non-demented elderly people 
(Kiosses & Alexopoulos, 2005) and schizophrenia patients (Weinberger & Gallhofer, 
1997). Executive functioning has also been found to predict important variables such as 
academic ability (Blair & Razza, 2007; Toll, Van der Ven, Kroesbergen, & Van Luit, 
2011) and social skills (Hensler et al., 2014; Schonfeld, Paley, Frankel, & O’Connor, 
2006).  
Executive functions may prospectively influence affective adjustment; 
Ghassabian et al., (2014) found that executive functions mediated the link between low 
positive emotionality at 3 years of age, and withdrawn temperament at 6 years. Impaired 
exceutive functioning has additionally been evidenced in remission from affective 
symptoms, and is therefore a potential source of trait-like vulnerability or lasting 
disability (Bhardwaj et al., 2010; Douglas & Porter, 2009; Huang, 2009; Lee et al., 
2012). It may be that not all patients with MDD suffer from executive dysfunction to an 
equal extent. According to a review by McIntyre et al. (2013), pronounced deficits in 
this area were present in about 20–30% of those with MDD. 
Different Models of Executive Functions 
The question of how cognitive functions are coordinated and selected has been 
approached from a variety of angles. Many models of various aspects of cognitive 
functioning have involved some form of control mechanism, such as Baddeley's central 




executive for working memory (Baddeley, 1996); Posner and Petersen's top down 
control of attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990); and Shallice and Norman’s supervisory 
attentional system (Shallice & Norman, 1986) necessary for controlled, complex and 
novel information processing. Even in more general conceptualizations, terminology 
used as well as the importance awarded different control functions varies. Some have 
argued for the primacy of goal-activation and maintenance (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, 
Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, & de Jong, 2004), the ability to 
maintain an active representation of context information in working memory (Braver & 
Cohen, 2001; Waskom et al., 2014) or navigating goals through a generalized cognitive 
search process (Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2010). Regardless of what is considered the 
main mechanism of executive control, it is clear that most researchers consider complex 
cognitive operations to be dependent on some form of regulation and selection, whether 
this is an emergent feature of the systems themselves or a separate process. The exact 
operationalization of the term, including the number, nature and organization of these 
executive functions, as well as the best way to assess them, varies somewhat in the 
literature (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Hammar & Årdal, 2009; Miyake et al., 2000).  
One Executive Function  
Some have argued for a unitary view of executive function, seeing it as a single 
construct. Della Sala, Gray, Spinnler, and Trivelli (1998) asserted that the most 
common neuropsychological tests all draw on a common resource, and that there is no 
support for fractionation into subcategories of executive functions. De Frias, Dixon, and 
Strauss (2006) found, using confirmatory factor analysis, that a single-factor structure of 
executive functions provided the best fit. It has also been suggested that the proposed 




functions of executive processes are better viewed as the outcome of other processes, 
such as working memory functioning (Kimberg, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1997).  
Multiple Executive Functions   
Most models, however, have posited a fragmentary view, consisting of distinct 
though often correlated mechanisms (P. Anderson, 2002; Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra, & 
Pulkkinen, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Although some 
executive functions have been found to depend on a general intelligence factor 
(Obonsawin et al., 2002), research has found that at least some functions (e.g. shifting 
and inhibition; Miyake et al., 2000) are independent of IQ. Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli 
(2000) reject the correlation with traditional IQ measures altogether. Further support for 
the fractionation of executive functions comes from the fact that various pathologies 
have been associated with distinct executive functions (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) as well as variable developmental trajectories (P. 
Anderson, 2002). Behavioral symptoms of poor executive regulation have also been 
reported to load on multiple distinct factors (Burgess et al., 1998). Many of the tasks 
used to measure executive functions have been found to correlate with each other 
(Miyake et al., 2000; Della Sala et al., 1998), but these correlations have usually been 
low (r = .40 or less; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007).  
Delis, Jacobson, Bondi, Hamilton, & Salmon (2003) have pointed out that in 
non-clinical populations, there tends to be a high degree of shared variance between 
tests of different cognitive functions, whereas the fragmentation becomes more apparent 
when comparing homogenous groups with focal neurological impairment to normative 
samples (Delis et al., 2003). There is still no consensus about the structure of executive 




functions. Even if there are a number of subprocesses, these could still reflect different 
functions of one unitary system (Baddeley, 1996).  
Measuring Executive Functions 
Features of executive function make it a difficult domain to study. The extent to 
which a task requires deliberate and superordinate processes may vary between 
individuals and situations; even within a single test session performace on a given task 
can become increasingly automatized, and therefore less dependent on controlled 
processes (Hughes & Graham, 2002). Slight variations in task characteristics can shift 
the processing from automatic to controlled (Hughes & Graham, 2002). This can also 
potentially make repeated measures designs tricky, as a task is only new once (Hughes 
& Graham, 2002). Another potential obstable to repeated testing, and consequently to 
assessing the reliability of executive function task measures, is that complex tasks 
involving a number of processes are likely to result in more sources of variation, and 
therefore a higher chance of measurement error (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan & Holdnack, 
2004). Establishing measures that are both complex and novel can thus come into 
conflict with the need for tests that are replicable and standardized. By definition, 
executive functions also integrate and depend on the intact operation of other cognitive 
domains, making it challenging to develop tasks with good discriminant validity, and to 
precicely describe the mechanisms of the executive functions (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; 
Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Stuss & Alexander, 2000).  
Real Life Implications of Executive Function Measurements 
As discussed, assessment of executive functions involves measuring processes 
that are relevant to performance and self-regulation in a complex environment. This 
implies another inherent problem with measuring executive functions, as some 




problems experienced in daily life may not be evident on structured laboratory tasks. 
Simple, short tasks with explicit requirements ordered one at a time and initiated by the 
experimenter do not require the same type of planning and organization of multiple 
tasks over time that is needed in real life (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). The need for 
testing procedures that replicate this element has been widely recognized (Goel, 
Grafman, Tajik, Gana, & Danto, 1997; Levine, Dawson, Boutet, Schwartz, & Stuss, 
2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Wilson, 1993). Goel et al., (1997) found that patients 
with frontal lobe damage performed adequately on specific, local tasks but were 
impaired when the task required more global, higher-level structuring of the problem, 
such as planning, shifting, allocating effort and generating feedback.  
There have been numerous observations of inconsistencies between scores on 
neuropsychological measures and difficulties in daily functioning (P. Anderson, 2002; 
Levine et al., 2000; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). Naismith et al. (2007) found that 
self-report and neuropsychological measures were concordant only for memory 
performance, but not for speed, learning or executive functions. Daily functioning could 
be influenced by compensatory strategies that are not available in the test situation, and 
performance may depend on specific environmental demands (Chaytor & Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 2003). Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe and Burr (2006) found that task 
measures only predicted 18-20% of the variance in everyday life functioning for a group 
of outpatients with various neurological conditions. This percentage was 51% when the 
non-executive components environmental cognitive demand and compensatory strategy 
were added.  
Other variables may also differentially inflluence performance in a testing 
situaltion and the daily environment. For instance, tests done in ideal environments may 




be less sensitive to effects of fatigue, distractions, emotions, and motivation; and high 
premorbid functioning and high IQ could mean that a large drop in daily functioning is 
experienced even with relatively small effects on specific tasks (Chaytor & Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 2003).  
The Components of Executive Function 
Regardless of these difficulties with measurement, there is mounting evidence 
that a number of proposed subcategories of executive functions are useful to our 
understanding of cognitive mechanisms, behavior and performance. The most 
commonly cited executive functions are, according to Miyake et al. (2000): “Shifting 
between tasks or mental sets”, “updating and monitoring of working memory 
representations” and, “inhibition of dominant or prepotent responses” (p.54). 
 Using confirmatory factor analysis they found the three factors; Shifting, 
Updating and Inhibition, to be moderately correlated but also distinguishable in tasks 
aimed at testing complex problem solving (Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, they concluded 
that although they may to a certain degree tap common resources or constitute aspects 
of a common construct, there is value in studying these elements separately when 
seeking to describe the mechanisms of executive function (Miyake et al., 2000). In a 
meta-analysis, Alvarez and Emory (2006) summarized previous findings and identified 
the factors constituting executive function as: “inhibition and switching”, “working 
memory” and “sustained and selective attention” (p.17). As this article examines the 
role of inhibition, it is relevant to note that this construct is common to various models, 
and well established as an independent subprocess of executive functions.  





Inhibition as an executive function refers to the capacity to overcome automatic, 
prepotent, routine, or dominant responses (Miyake et al., 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 
1993; Shuster & Toplak, 2009). There are indications that inhibition could be valuable 
to understanding the relationship between affective symptoms, information processing 
and neurological impairments. In a recent review of the ways in which poor cognitive 
control causes a vulnerability to low affect (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), inhibition had a 
central role. The authors suggested that the inability to disengage from, or inhibit, 
negative stimuli could be detrimental to the regulation of affect in multiple ways, 
leading to negatively biased appraisals and increased exposure to stressful stimuli 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Joormann and Gotlib (2010) reported that depression was 
associated with reduced inhibition of negative material. Furthermore, they found a 
correlation between emotion regulation strategies and inhibition (Joormann & Gotlib, 
2010). Specifically, reduced inhibition was linked to more rumination, more expressive 
suppression and less reappraisal. Others have also linked impaired inhibition of 
negatively valenced material to depression (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; 
Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005). Impairment of inhibitory 
functions could therefore plausibly contribute to depression vulnerability.  
It has further been suggested that inhibition has a central role in executive 
functioning. Inhibition has been found to correlate even with cognitive tests that were 
not viewed as executive function tasks, prompting Burgess et al. (1998) to suggest that 
this factor might be viewed as a «primary form of executive function» (p.555) that 
underlies problems on many other tests of cognitive functioning, and issues concerning 
social behavior, as well as being linked to the concept of general intelligence. A factor-




solution, highlighting the primacy of inhibition, was found when measuring every-day 
dysexecutive symptoms in a non-clinical population (Chan, 2001). Others have also 
suggested that the different executive functions require intact inhibition to operate 
optimally (Barkley, 1997; Bull & Scerif, 2001; Diamond, Carlson, & Beck, 2005). This 
could potentially explain the correlations between different executive functions (Bull & 
Scerif, 2001). As previously mentioned, executive functions become especially relevant 
in novel situations and in cognitive conflicts (Goel et al., 1997; Levine et al., 2000; 
Lezak, 1982; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). Inhibition of the habitual, competing response 
is therefore conceptually plausible as an essential part of cognitive control. Inhibition 
has been shown to be one of the earliest executive functions to develop in children 
(Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), so other capacities could theoretically build on the ability to 
inhibit. The primary role of inhibition is not undisputed; it has for instance been 
suggested that the purported effects of inhibition are better accounted for by differences 
in processing speed or working memory (Conway & Engle, 1994; Salthouse & Meinz, 
1995). 
Inhibition in Daily Life 
The previously discussed methodological issues concerning executive functions 
in general are also significant obstacles to describing and operationalizing inhibition, 
and subsequently determining what role it has in depression. As cognitive inhibition 
cannot be observed directly, the presence and mechanisms of inhibition must be inferred 
from behavior (Klein & Taylor, 1994). The types of tasks or behaviors used to define 
the construct of inhibition have varied substantially, and there have been doubts about 
the coherence of the inhibition construct across these different tasks and behaviors 
(Klein & Taylor, 1994; Rabbit, 1997). MacLeod (2007) has suggested that a common 




source of confusion in inhibition research is that “in cognition, inhibition is sometimes a 
measurable phenomenon, sometimes a theory about the cause of that phenomenon, and 
often both” (p.5). As discussed, much of the research into executive functions has used 
performance based measures, and the degree of overlap with behavior in daily life is not 
well established (MacLeod, 2007). Experienced problems with inhibitory control and 
impulsivity have been associated with deficits on many typical neurological tasks 
(Chan, 2001; Enticott, Ogloff, & Bradshaw, 2006; Fino et al., 2014; Posner et al., 2002), 
but there have also been a lot of contradictory findings (Mcauley, Chen, Goos, 
Schachar, & Crosbie, 2010; Samyn, Roeyers, Bijttebier, Rosseel, & Wiersema, 2015; 
Toplak et al., 2013). 
Burgess et al. (1998) identified inhibition as a factor that accounted for 
symptoms of disinhibition on a behavioral level, as well as on a range of executive 
function tests. Zhou, Chen and Main (2012) have pointed out that the concept of 
inhibition in daily life has a lot in common with the temperamental dimension effortful 
control, which is often assessed using the same types of tasks (e.g. Stroop and Go/No-
Go; Zhou et al., 2012). Effortful control involves self-regulation of emotion, thought 
and actions (Rothbart, Sheese, & Posner, 2007) and has been found to moderate the 
effects of negative or positive affect, rumination and depressive symptoms (Verstraeten, 
Vasey, Raes, & Bijttebier, 2009). Low effortful control has been reported to constitute a 
vulnerability to depression (Verstraeten et al., 2009). Zhou et al. (2012) identified 
inhibition, in addition to attentional control, as a central common characteristic that 
unites the terms executive functions and effortful control from cognitive neuroscience 
and personality/temperament perspectives respectively. However, they also point out 
the important distinction between them; where inhibition in the framework of effortful 




control typically centers on emotional or motivational responses, the executive control 
paradigm typically assesses the inhibition of “cold” cognitive responses (Zhou et al., 
2012). Blair and Razza (2007) have observed that while executive functions are usually 
thought of as volitional control mechanisms, effortful control often involves automatic 
or non-conscious regulation. They found that these two concepts were moderately 
correlated and accounted for distinct variance in children's academic ability (Blair & 
Razza, 2007). It is a possibility that this reflects a difference between the kinds of 
regulatory mechanisms that are relevant in daily life, and those that are needed for 
specific, limited tasks. 
Multiple Inhibiting Processes 
Nigg (2000) outlined eight different inhibitory functions grouped into executive, 
motivational and automatic processes. In his taxonomy, the Stroop task, similar to the 
CWIT in the present study (Delis, 2001), was classified as a measure of interference 
control (Nigg, 2000). Other common performance measures of inhibition, such as the 
Stop task and the Go/No-Go were regarded measures of behavioral inhibition, whereas 
suppressing irrelevant ideas and intrusive thoughts were considered examples of 
cognitive inhibition (Nigg, 2000). There were all under the umbrella of executive 
inhibition, while motivational inhibition effects denoted responses to punishment and 
novelty (Nigg, 2000). This is noteworthy as everyday life involves demands on 
inhibition in a variety of ways. Friedman and Miyake (2004), using structural equation 
modeling, found that they could separate two kinds of cognitive inhibition. One factor 
involved inhibiting prepotent responses as well as resisting distraction interference 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This was related to problems such as everyday cognitive 
failures and task switching (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The other factor consisted of 




the ability to resist proactive interference and related to, amongst other things, resisting 
unwanted intrusive thoughts (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Thus, the type inhibition task 
may affect the results in studies of inhibition, and tasks might need to be carefully 
selected based on the goals of the study. It remains to be established whether certain 
types of inhibition are more relevant to depression, and whether different forms of 
inhibition are differentially related to various aspects of depression such as regulation of 
affect, and disability. 
Even on tasks apparently measuring very similar inhibition capacities, 
discrepancies in performance have been found. Khng and Lee (2014) compared the 
performance of adolescent pupils on two inhibition tasks that are both supposed to 
require inhibition of an inappropriate prepotent response, the Stroop task and the Stop-
Signal task, and found no correlation. They also reported that they were associated with 
different neural substrates and developmental trajectories, affected clinical subgroups 
differently and loaded on different factors (Khng & Lee, 2014). Attempting to explain 
this discrepancy, they distinguished between inhibiting intrusion by recently learned 
responses, and intrusion by habitual responses, the former being related to general 
intelligence (Khng & Lee, 2009). In their account, the Stop-Signal task is among the 
tests that measure intrusion of recently learned material, whereas Stroop measures 
intrusion from more entrenched material (Khng & Lee, 2009), a distinction supported 
by other researchers as well (Bull & Scerif, 2001). The CWIT, at least the pure 
inhibition condition, is therefore according to this account presumably an example of 
inhibition of well-learned responses as it is similar to Stroop (Delis et al., 2001). If the 
different types of inhibition are fragmented in this way, the utility of any one type of 
measure in predicting functioning in another setting becomes questionable. It is possible 




that these various forms of inhibition are manifestations of one core cognitive process, 
but this form of hierarchy has not been adequately described (MacLeod, 2007), and thus 
inferences about what tests better capture this hypothetical core process cannot be made.  
Comparing Measures of Inhibition 
Direct comparisons between self-reported inhibition on BRIEF-A and 
performance on the CWIT for depressed adults were not found, but limited research was 
available for other populations, and for the relationship between task and scale measures 
of executive functions more generally. Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe (2003) 
reviewed six studies on the ecological validity of various executive functioning tests, 
and concluded that over all, they did not significantly correlate with self-report 
measures. Samyn et al. (2015) have suggested that the two types of measurement reflect 
different underlying constructs, as revealed by a latent-variable analysis of multiple task 
and scale measures of executive function, including inhibition. For an adult sample with 
mild to moderate traumatic brain injury, self-reported cognitive problems predicted 
some objective performance in attention/processing speed, but depressive 
symptomatology was a much better predictor of objective executive functioning than 
self-reports (Schiehser et al., 2011). 
There are some studies that have compared the CWIT, or Stroop (similar to the 
CWIT; Delis et al., 2001) with scale rating measures other than BRIEF. For example 
Heflin et al. (2011), who found no correlation between Stroop results and a behavioral 
rating of disinhibition for patients with mild cognitive impairment or dementia. Chan 
(2001) found a barely significant (p = .05) and weak (r = .18) correlation between 
Stroop results and the factor Inhibition, created from responses to the Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire, amongst adults from the general population.  




There have also been studies of the relationship of BRIEF-A and a variety of 
task measures. Toplak et al. (2013) reviewed thirteen different studies of patients with 
mild cognitive impairment or dementia that had compared BRIEF-A scores with various 
objective measures of executive functions. They found a median correlation of r = .15 
for the various possible scale correlations, described by the authors as “extremely weak” 
(p.136). This was also the case for other rating scales; the Dysexecutive Questionnaire 
and scale measures of impulsivity, indicating that the problem here was not just with 
BRIEF (Toplak et al., 2013). Toplak et al. (2013) explained these findings by proposing 
that the measures pertain to different levels of cognitive control. According to the 
authors, everyday functioning, rated on scales such as BRIEF-A, is a matter of the 
reflective mind (Toplak et al., 2013). At the reflective level, thinking style, goals, beliefs 
and decisions play a large part (Stanovich, 2011; Toplak et al., 2013). Objective 
measures on the other hand, supposedly examine the relatively narrow functions at the 
level of the algorithmic mind (Toplak et al., 2013), which reflects the functional 
efficiency of the cognitive mechanisms (Stanovich, 2011). Stanovich (2011) has argued 
that constrained executive function tasks cannot assess strategic control processes, 
which occur at the level of the reflective mind. Toplak et al. (2013) also noted that a 
common methodological problem in studies comparing measures of executive function, 
including inhibition, is the use of multiple measures yielding a large number of 
correlations, of which only some are reported.  
Relationship Between the CWIT and BRIEF-A 
Of the studies reviewed by Toplak et al. (2013), only a few looked at both 
BRIEF and the CWIT. Parrish et al. (2007) reported correlations between parent-
reported BRIEF scores and the CWIT, but in a sample of children with epilepsy. They 




found that while both could distinguish the epilepsy from the non-epilepsy groups, the 
only correlation with CWIT was the Metacognition Index from BRIEF (Parrish et al., 
2007). V. A. Anderson, P. Anderson, Northam, Jacobs and Mikiewicz (2002) found 
moderate positive correlations (from r = .27 to r = .48) between self-corrections on the 
Contingency Naming Task, a test similar to Stroop (Riddle & Suhr, 2012), and scores 
on BRIEF, particularly on scales belonging to the Metacognition Index. The population 
in this study was children with brain disease (V. A. Anderson et al., 2002). Shuster and 
Toplak (2009) reported a negative correlation (r = -.32, p >.01) between the Inhibit 
scale on BRIEF self-report and Stroop interference in a non-clinical population. This 
implies that more interference on Stroop was actually related to fewer self-reported 
difficulties on BRIEF (Shuster & Toplak, 2009). Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
number of self-corrections positively correlated with Stroop interference score, but 
negatively with BRIEF scores (Shuster & Toplak, 2009). The authors suggest that self-
corrections may be an example of something that contributes to good inhibition scores 
on self-reports but poor performance scores (Shuster & Toplak, 2009). They also found 
that performance measures of other types of inhibition significantly predicted responses 
on BRIEF independently of Stroop, suggesting the different measures might be 
assessing independent aspects of performance (Shuster & Toplak, 2009). Hummer et al. 
(2011) also reported a negative correlation between Stroop Interference and the Inhibit 
scale from BRIEF (pr(35)  =  -0.37, p  =  .02), when controlling for gender. Their sample 
consisted of adolescents that had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or 
disruptive behviour disorders and healthy controls (Hummer et al., 2011).  
In a study not included in the review by Toplak et al. (2013), Lalonde, Henry, 
Drouin-Germain, Nolin, and Beauchamp (2013) reported that amongst typically 




developing adolescents, the CWIT did not predict results on parent-reported BRIEF. 
Interestingly, their virtual-reality version of the Stroop test did, however, leading the 
authors to suggest that it is a matter of ecological validity (Lalonde et al., 2013)  
In summary, the reported correlations between BRIEF and the CWIT (or similar 
tasks) have been at best partial and moderate, and the direction of the relationship is 
inconsistent. Findings regarding the relationships between specific subscales on the two 
tests have also been inconsistent. The two kinds of test may be sensitive to different 
pathologies, as the discussed reseach has used widely varying populations. In the study 
by Samyn et al. (2015) only the objective measure was able to identify children with 
ADHD, or autism spectrum disorder. V. A. Anderson et al. (2002) found that the 
BRIEF-profile was distinct for children with focal frontal lesions when compared to 
more diffuse brain damage, whereas the objective measures could not. The correlation 
between the two types of measures might be determined in part by the clinical picture of 
the participants. It has been suggested that the correlation between task measures and 
daily problems may be higher for clinical populations, for whom the symptoms are 
more obvious, than for the general population (Chan, 2001). In line with this, Heinonen 
et al. (2013) found that BRIEF correlated with task measures of executive functions, 
including Stroop, for term-born control participants but not for very low birthweight 
adults. For the latter group, only parent ratings correlated with objective measures 
(Heinonen et al., 2013). With so many different populations and measures used, it's 
therefore not possible to draw any conclusions about adults with MDD. The fact that 
there have been reports of poor correspondence between tests, and differing underlying 
factor solutions, might indicate a need for a great degree of specificity when comparing 
findings.  




The present study did focus on a specific group, MDD patients at one year after 
their first depressive episode. Previous studies of this sample by Schmid and Hammar 
(2013a, 2013b) have indicated that a deficit in cognitive inhibition as measured by the 
CWIT is present during first episode MDD and persists one year after initial diagnosis, 
despite symptom reduction (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). The patients were particularly 
impaired on the inhibition condition with an added demand on cognitive flexibility 
(Inhibition/Switching; Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). Performance on the 
Inhibition/Switching condition was also worse at both testing times for the group that 
relapsed compared to those who did not (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). There was no 
relationship between cognitive flexibility measured by other tasks and relapse or 
persistent impairment, suggesting inhibition is of primary interest (Schmid & Hammar, 
2013b).  
Groups that relapsed or experienced little or no change in their symptoms had a 
higher rating for illness severity at both testing times, but the effects of illness severity 
were controlled for when the relationship between cognitive function and relapse was 
assessed (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). The correlation between illness severity and 
inhibition impairment was not significant, indicating that the impact of inhibition was 
not a result of illness severity (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). Schmid & Hammar (2013b) 
also found that the slower reaction times on the inhibition task were not simply the 
result of lower processing speed. 
The Current Study  
The present study examined the relationship between self-reported and objective 
measures of inhibition at a one-year follow up of participants after they had presented 
with their first episode of depression. The goal was to investigate whether BRIEF-A 




measures corroborated the results obtained using the CWIT which have indicated a 
lasting executive function deficit for previously depressed patients, especially in the 
area of inhibition (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). Another objective was to see how the 
task measure of inhibition correlated with self reported general executive functioning 
and inhibition. I also wanted to know if the relationship between self-reported inhibition 
deficits and relapse was similar to that of task measured inhibition and relapse at follow 
up. Three questions were addressed: 
1. Do participants diagnosed with MDD have a higher score on BRIEF-A than controls? 
2. Do self-reported problems with general executive functioning, and cognitive 
inhibition specifically (BRIEF-A), correspond to the objective measure of cognitive 
inhibition (D-KEFS) for all groups?  
3. Do those participants who experienced relapse within a year have a higher self-
reported (BRIEF-A) deficit in inhibition than those who did not? 
As previous analysis of the same participants using objective test measures have 
shown a persistent deficit in inhibition for the patient group (Schmid & Hammar, 
2013b), it was expected that this would also be evident on self-report measures of the 
same cognitive construct. It was therefore hypothesized that the scores on BRIEF-A 
would be higher for depressed participants (Hypothesis 1) and that the two measures 
would be positively correlated (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, a larger deficit in inhibition 
was detected amongst patients who experienced a relapse, both at initial testing and at a 
one-year follow-up. It was therefore hypothesized that patients who experienced a 
relapse would also have a higher score on self-reported inhibition problems as measured 
by BRIEF-A at one year follow up compared to those who did not relapse (Hypothesis 
3).  





The current study is an extension of a larger longitudinal study of cognitive functioning 
in depression (Schmid and Hammar 2013a, 2013b). It is a crossectional analysis of data 
collected at a one-year follow-up. The participants have therefore been tested at two 
times, but the present analyses focused on the results from the second testing, a year 
after participants presented with their first depressive epidode. Results will be discussed 
in the context of previous findings using this sample.  
Participants 
Fifty-three participants (27 male, 26 female) between the ages of 20 and 42 (M = 
27.1, SD = 5.3) were included in the analyses. They consisted of 26 patients who had 
met the criteria for MDD one year previously and 27 control subjects. See Table 1 for 
descriptive data. The participants included in this study were tested at two times; first at 
inclusion (T1), then one year later (T2). The present analysis concerns the results from 
T2, and used only those participants for whom the relevant data was available. This 
means that there were slightly fewer cases included in this analysis (N = 53) than at T1 
(N = 60), due to dropout and lacking data. 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive data for the patient group and the control group at T2. 
 Patient group (n = 26) Control group (n = 27) 
Variable M SD  M SD 
Age 26.12 5.55  26.15 5.18 Education (years) 13.92 1.71  14.22 1.63 Males/females 13/13 -  13/14 - MADRS score 9.72 5.54  - - 
Note. MADRS = Montgomery Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (Montgomery & 
Åsberg, 1979). MADRS scores not reported for healthy controls without symptoms of 
depression. 
 




Inclusion. Inclusion criteria for the patient group at T1 was meeting the DSM-
IV (2000) criteria for a unipolar first-episode MDD diagnosis, as assessed using the 
MINI-International Psychiatric Structural Interview (Leiknes, Leganger, Malt, & Malt, 
1999). In addition, a minimum score of 20 on the Montgomery Åsberg Depression 
Rating Scale (MADRS), indicating a moderate to severe depression (Montgomery & 
Åsberg, 1979), was required. Patients who reported having previously experienced 
serious symptoms of depression, or who had been diagnosed with or treated for 
depression were excluded. As were patients with known brain damage, severe somatic 
disorders, alcohol and/or substance abuse, those who had been treated with 
electroconvulsive therapy, were psychotic or had experienced psychosis earlier in life.  
Participants were recruited through primary health care. Doctors and 
psychologists informed patients about the study and determinded who qualified for 
inclusion based on the criteria. The study coordinator then contacted those who were 
considered appropriate for inclusion and who consented to participate. At inclusion in 
the study, the MINI (Leiknes et al., 1999) was administered by a trained clinical 
psychologist in order to get a broad evaluation of psychiatric illnesses. Two patients 
reported symptoms of panic disorder, and met the criteria of a co-morbid diagnosis of 
panic disorder with agoraphobia.  
All patients were outpatients. Some received either medical treatment (13.3%), 
psychological treatment (30%) or both (33.3%), and some (23.3%) received no 
treatment. Fourteen patients were prescribed antidepressant medication. Twelve patients 
were prescribed selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs; Cipralex, Citalopram); 
one used a serotonin noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor (SNRI; Effexor), and one used a 
tetracyclic antidepressant (TeCA; Remeron/Mirtazapine).  




A control group (n=30) was matched to the patients at T1, based on gender, age 
and years of education (within a ±2 year limit). IQ scores were similar for the patient 
group (M = 118.53, SD = 8.12) and the control group (M = 120.97, SD = 8.23). Control 
participants were recruited from the University of Bergen and through acquaintances of 
employees of the Department of Biological and Medical Psychology of the University 
of Bergen. The controls were interviewed to rule out those who reported a history of 
mental disorder, brain damage, alcohol abuse or substance abuse.  
Follow-up. At T2, one year later, the mean MADRS score for patient group was 
9.72, indicating minimal symptoms of depression, and no need of treatment (Hawley et 
al., 2002). Of the 26 patients included in the present analysis, nine participants were 
using medication at T2, of which eight used SSRIs (Cipralex, Citalopram) and one used 
an SNRI (Venlafaxine).  
At T2, the patients were grouped based on whether or not they had experienced a 
relapse since T1. The sample was therefore divided into a relapse group (n = 10), a no 
relapse group (n = 7) and a no change group (n = 2). The relapse and no relapse groups 
had a mean score on MADRS below 10, indicating that at the time of testing, depression 
severity for these groups was low and treatment not required (Hawley et al., 2002). The 
no change group reported experiencing their depression as more chronic, with short 
periods (lasting days or weeks) of minor symptoms. At follow-up, they had a mean 
MADRS score of 18, indicating a mild to moderate depression requiring treatment 
(Hawley et al., 2002). There were no major differences between the relapse group and 
the no relapse group regarding treatment variables across T1 and T2.  





The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System. The participants were assessed 
using the The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001) at 
T1 and T2. The D-KEFS is a neuropsychological battery made up of nine tests that can 
be used on their own or together with other parts of the set. It contains measures of 
verbal and non-verbal executive function, and assesses the function of more basic 
cognitive processes as well as executive functions, in order to distinguish the 
performance of each (Delis et al., 2001). A large number of studies with varied clinical 
populations have established that the D-KEFS tests are sensitive to impairements in 
executive functions and have adequate reliability compared to other executive measures 
(Delis et al., 2004). 
The Color Word Interference Test. The test from the D-KEFS that was used for 
analysis in in the present study was the Color Word Interference Test (CWIT). It is 
based on the classic Stroop test developed to study verbal interference effects (Delis et 
al., 2001). There have been numerous investigations of the reliability and validity of 
Stroop, showing good reliability and sensitivity to executive deficits, even though some 
practice effects have been reported (Homack & Riccio, 2004). The CWIT is intended to 
measure the ability to inhibit dominant, perserverative and impulsive verbal responses 
as well as requiring cognitive flexibility. It is made up of four conditions. In the Color 
Naming condition (C), the subject is presented with color patches and asked to name the 
color as fast as they can. In Word Reading (W), they are asked to read a word written in 
black, as fast as possible. The third condition, Color Word (CW), a measure of 
inhibition, is the classic Stroop condition, where participants are presented with color 
names written with different color fonts and asked to name the ink color. This requires 




inhibition of word reading. In the fourth condition, Inhibition/Switching (IS), the 
subject has to switch between saying the color and reading the word depending on 
whether the word is in a frame, requiring set shifting as well as inhibition (Delis et al., 
2001; Lippa & Davis, 2010; Swanson, 2005). The IS condition is assumed to be more 
difficult, although Lippa & Davis (2010) have shown that this is not always the case. 
Faster reaction times on the CW and IS conditions are thought to reflect a better 
ability to inhibit interference and switch between mental sets (Delis et al., 2001). 
The Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Adult Version. 
Participants were also given a Norwegian translation of the Behavior Rating Inventory 
of Executive Function—Adult Version (BRIEF-A; Nicholas & Solbakk, 2006). The 
adult version is based on the original BRIEF (Gioia, Isquith, Guy & Kenworthy, 2000), 
created to measure childrens’ executive functioning as rated by their parents and 
teachers. The BRIEF-A contains a self-report form as well as an informant-report (Roth 
et al., 2005), but only the self-report was used in the current study to assess self-
reported executive functioning in daily life. 
The BRIEF-A self-report contains 75 items that assess the respondent on nine 
clinical scales and three validity scales. For each of the 75 items, the respondent marks 
whether they experience the statement as true frequently, sometimes or never. The nine 
clinical scales reflect distinct and empirically validated constructs that capture different 
facets of executive functioning. They are: Inhibit, Shift and Emotional Control, which 
grouped together are referred to as the Behavioral Regulation Index; and Self Monitor 
Initiate, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Task Monitor and Organization of Materials, 
which make up the Metacognition Index. The overall summary score is the Global 
Executive Composite (GEC). BRIEF-A has been used with a wide range of disorders to 




assess executive functioning in adults between 18 and 90, and its reliability, validity and 
utility have been established empirically (Roth et al., 2005). 
Inhibition. The Inhibit scale in BRIEF (Roth et al., 2005) consists of eight 
questions meant to capture «the ability to inhibit, resist or not act on impulse» (p.20). It 
can manifest as inappropriate, unsafe or disruptive behavior, a tendency to interrupt 
others and problems on delayed response tasks (Roth et al., 2005). Poor behavioral 
inhibition is often observed in ADHD and after traumatic brain injury (Roth et al., 
2005). Some example questions from this scale are: item 16, «I have trouble sitting 
still»; item 43, «I make decisions that get me into trouble (legally, financially, 
socially)»; item 55, «People say that I am easily distracted» and item 73, «I am 
impulsive» (Roth et al., 2005). 
The participants were also evaluated on a comprehensive test battery that 
included measures of IQ and other standardized experimental tests. They were not 
analyzed in the present study, but have been discussed previously (Schmid & Hammar, 
2013a, 2013b). 
Testing Procedure 
Testing took place at the Institute of Biological and Medical Psychology, 
University of Bergen, Norway, and was administered by a trained senior test technician. 
The test technician was not blinded to which participants belonged to control group and 
which were patients, because of the nature of the recruitment procedure. Testing 
occurred in the same sequence for all participants, took about four hours to complete 
and was done during regular work-hours.  





The Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics and The Norwegian Data 
Protection Authority has approved the study. The study was performed in accordance 
with the Helsinki Declaration of the World Medical Association Assembly. All 
participants gave their informed consent to participate at inclusion. The participants 
diagnosed with MDD were offered the normal treatment independently of the study.  
Scoring and Data Analyses 
For all analyses, raw scores were used. For both conditions on the CWIT, this 
consisted of the time taken to complete the tasks in seconds. For BRIEF, each item was 
converted to a score, with 1 corresponding to Never, 2 corresponding to Sometimes and 
3 corresponding to Often. These were then summarized to produce the raw score. The 
statistical data analysis was done in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 22. Effect sizes were calculated using the formula r = z / square root of 
N. 
Results 
The data violated assumptions of normality. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Levene's 
test were significant at the .01 level for the GEC and Inhibit scales of BRIEF-A. CWIT 
Condition 4 had a very high level of kurtosis (6.81) and high positive skewness (1.75). 
Non-parametric tests were used. The results for the three hypotheses are discussed in 
turn.  
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was that previously depressed participants would have a 
higher score on the Global Executive Composite (GEC) and Inhibit scales on BRIEF-A 
than controls. See Table 2 for an overview of the raw scores and T-scores. 




A Mann-Whitney U test revealed significant differences between the patient 
group (Md = 116, n = 26) and the control group (Md = 79, n = 27) on the GEC, U= 39, z 
= -5.55, p =.00, r = - .76. There was also a significant difference between the patient 
group (Md = 11, n = 26) and the control group (Md = 9, n = 27) on the Inhibit subscale, 
U = 176, z = -3.164, p =.00, r = - .43.  
Table 2 
 
BRIEF-A and CWIT scores for the patient group and the control group at T2. 
 Patient group (n = 26) Control group (n = 27) 
Score M SD  M SD 
BRIEF-A GEC (raw) 119.19 23.58  81.74 10.89 
BRIEF-A Inhibit (raw) 11.73 2.96  9.41 1.53 
BRIEF-A GEC T-score 57.27 11.26  39.59 4.92 
BRIEF-A Inhibit T-score 49.27 9.88  41.22 4.99 
CWIT (CW) 47.62 1.33  41.70 1.31 
CWIT (IS) 56.73 2.33  47.93 2.29 
Note. GEC = Global Executive Composite. CWIT = Color Word Interference Test. CW 
= Color Word. IS = Inhibition/Switching. BRIEF-A T-scores ≥ 65 considered clinically 
significant. For T-scores, M = 50, SD = 10 (Roth et al., 2005). 
 
A look at the T-scores of the two groups revealed that nine cases (34.6%) in the 
patient group, and none of the controls, had a GEC score of 65 or, the cutoff score for 
clinical significance (Roth et al., 2005).  
Additional analyses of the change in BRIEF-A raw scores from T1 and T2 were 
done to assess the stability of these reported problems with inhibition and executive 
functioning across one year. T1 BRIEF-A data was only available for 31 cases, of 
which 18 were patients and 13 controls. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test revealed a 
statistically significant reduction in the GEC scores from T1 (Md = 94.00) to T2 (Md = 
90), z = -2.11, p = .04, with a small to medium effect size (r = .27). 




An examination of the subscales using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test revealed 
that the only significant change was on the scales that make up the Metacognition 
Index, z = 3.18, p = .001, which decreased from T1 (Md = 53) to T2 (Md = 50), with a 
large effect size (r = .57). Splitting the group into control and patients revealed that the 
change on the GEC measured by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was significant for the 
patient group (n = 13), z = -2.48, p = .013 but not for the control group (n = 18), z = -
1.92, p = .05. It is possible that splitting the groups this way resulted in insufficient 
power, as the total number of cases was only 31. These analyses of change scores 
constitute a tentative indication that scores on BRIEF-A were not completely stable 
after one year. It was only the scales subsumed by the Metacognition Index that 
changed significantly. It appears that the scores changed more for the patient group, but 
this is speculative, as there are probably too few data points to examine the statistical 
significance of this difference in change scores reliably.  
The BRIEF-A Inhibit and GEC scores were compared with the depression 
symptoms, as measured on MADRS. Spearman's Rank Order Correlation revealed a 
significant correlation between the GEC and MADRS scores, r = .63, n = 25, p = .001. 
There was no significant correlation between MADRS scores and the BRIEF-A 
Inhibtion scale, r = .312, n = 25, p = .13  
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis was that self-reported problems with cognitive inhibition 
(BRIEF-A) would correlate with the objective measure of cognitive inhibition (CWIT) 
for all groups.  
The relationships between the Inhibit scale on BRIEF-A and reaction time on 
Condition 3 (Inhibit) and Condition 4 (Inhibit/switch) of the CWIT were investigated 




using Spearman's Spearman's Rank Order Correlation. See Table 3 for correlations. 
There was no significant correlation between the Inhibit scale and reaction time on 
Condition 3, r = .05, n = 53, p = .75. There was also no correlation between the Inhibit 
scale and Condition 4, r = .13, n = 53, p = .35. There was a significant positive 
correlation of medium effect size between the GEC on BRIEF-A and condition 3, r = 
.30, n = 53, p = .03. There was also a significant positive correlation between the GEC 
and condition 4, r = .37, n = 53, p = .006. Adjusting for multiple correlations using a 
Bonferroni correction, only the correlation between Condition 4 and the GEC were 
significant at the required .01 level, indicating a positive correlation between the total 
number of self-reported problems with executive functioning and longer reaction times 
on the Inhibition/Switching condition of the CWIT. 
Table 3 
 
Correlations (Spearmans rho) between raw scores on the BRIEF-A and the CWIT for 
the whole sample (N = 53). 
BRIEF-A Scale Condition 3 (CW) Condition 4 (IS) 
GEC  .297* .370** 
Inhibit  .045 .132 
Note. GEC = Global Executive Composite; CW = Color Word; IS = Inhibition 
Switching. 
*p < 0.05 (2-tailed). **p < 0.01(2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 3  
The third hypothesis was that those participants who had relapsed within a year 
would have a significantly higher self-reported (BRIEF-A) deficit in inhibition at T2 
than those who didn't. 
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant differences between the relapse 
group (Md = 133.5, n = 10) and the no relapse group (Md = 105, n = 7) on the GEC 




scores, U = 26, z = -.878, p = .42. There was also no significant difference between the 
relapse group (Md = 10.5, n =10) and the no relapse group (Md = 12, n = 7) on the 
Inhibit subscale, U = 30, z = -.45, p = .67. The low number of participants means there 
is a greater chance of type II error for this test.  
In the relapse group, 50% had a GEC T-score above 65, in the no relapse group 
28.6% had a GEC T-score of more than 65. 
An exploration of the relationship between BRIEF-A scores at T1 and relapse 
was severely limited by the sample size, as BRIEF-A data was only available for five 
cases in the relapse group and three cases in the no relapse group at T1. For these, the 
difference between the relapse group (Md = 115, n = 5) and the no relapse group (Md = 
131, n = 3) in T1 GEC scores was non-significant, U = 5.5, z = -.60, p = .57. 
Discussion  
The aim of this article was to examine persistent impairment of executive 
function, particularly inhibition, in first episode depression. Scores from the Behavior 
Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Adult Version (BRIEF-A) and the Color 
Word Interference Test (CWIT) from a one-year follow up were analyzed. The results 
supported a hypothesis of significantly elevated BRIEF-A scores for the patient group 
despite symptom remission, indicating persistent self-reported problems with inhibition 
and general executive functioning. This was consistent with findings of persistently 
impaired performance on the CWIT of inhibition in the same sample (Schmid & 
Hammar, 2013a). There were, however, significant differences between the two 
measures. There was some support for the hypothesis of a correlation between BRIEF-
A and CWIT measures of executive function, but this was only the case for the BRIEF-
A General Executive Composite (GEC) scale and the Inhibition/Switching (IS) 




condition of the CWIT. There was no significant correlation of between the Inhibit scale 
on BRIEF-A and inhibition as measured by CWIT. There was no support for the 
hypothesis of a significant difference between the BRIEF-A scores of the relapse group 
and the no relapse groups, even though CWIT measured inhibition was persistently 
worse for the relapse group (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). These findings will be 
discussed in turn. 
Scores on BRIEF-A  
There was support for the first hypothesis; the patient group reported significant 
problems with executive function, including inhibition, despite symptom remission. The 
effect size was large for the GEC and moderate for the Inhibit scale. 
Some additional analyses were done to address the stability of the self-reported 
deficit, and the independence from affective symptoms. It was apparent that the scores 
decreased somewhat from T1 to T2, although the effect was small. It was also mainly 
the items subsumed by the Metacognition Index (MI) that improved. The MI score 
reflects the ability plan, organize and approach problems systematically and consists of 
five clinical scales that do not include Inhibit (Roth et al., 2005). The scores appeared to 
have improved more for the patient group, several of whom have gone from being in a 
depressive episode to no longer experiencing a depressive episode, although a larger 
data set is necessary to adequately investigate whether this group difference in change 
scores is significant. Some improvement has also been reported for CWIT scores 
(Schmid & Hammar, 2013b), with performance on the Color Word condition improving 
significantly for the no relapse group and Inhibition/Switching scores improving 
significantly for the control group.  




There was a significant correlation between the patients' MADRS scores and 
GEC scores, but not the Inhibit scale. Despite the mean score for MADRS being at a 
level interpreted as remission (Hawley, Gale, & Sivakumaran, 2002), 10 out of 26 cases 
still had a score of 11 or above, indicating mild depression, and one case had a score of 
22, just above the cutoff for moderate depression. This indicates that some influence of 
low-level residual symptoms on the GEC cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that 
persistent problems with executive functioning could lead to low-level symptoms 
associated with depression. 
It was noted that nine of the patients, but none of the controls, had a BRIEF-A 
T-score of 65 or more, indicating clinically significant elevation (Roth et al., 2000). 
This allows for the possibility that a subset of MDD patients experience more 
significant problems with executive functions. McIntyre et al. (2013) suggested 
executive deficits were present in about 20-30% of depressed individuals. In this study, 
about 34.6% have clinically significant scores on BRIEF-A.  
In summary, some of the self-reported problems with executive functioning in 
daily life appear to improve somewhat after symptom remission, but BRIEF-A scores 
for the patient group nonetheless remain significantly higher than for controls. Scores 
on the Inhibit scales are also significantly different for the patient and control groups, 
and appear to be more stable across one year. There is a significant correlation between 
the GEC scale and MADRS scores, but not the Inhibit scale and MADRS scores. 
The Relationship between the BRIEF-A and the CWIT 
There was partial support for the second hypothesis. There was no correlation 
between self-reported inhibition measured by BRIEF-A and inhibition as measured by 
the CWIT. There was, however, a significant correlation between the 




Inhibition/Switching condition in the CWIT and the GEC in BRIEF-A. Before a 
Bonferroni correction, the Inhibition condition was also significantly correlated with the 
GEC. This suggests that self-reported executive functioning in general was correlated 
with inhibition performance, but self-reported inhibition was not. 
It is possible that with a larger sample, the Inhibit scale would also have reached 
significance. The fact that the GEC, but not Inhibit, was correlated with MADRS score 
could mean that the relationship between GEC score and CWIT performance was 
somehow related to low level affective symptoms, even if there was no direct 
correlation between CWIT and MADRS. It could also be that inaccurate self-perception 
affects scores on the self-report measure. Alternatively, the results may reflect some real 
difference between the underlying constructs being measured. If the results are 
replicated in other samples, they may reflect a notable difference between the CWIT 
and the BRIEF-A.  
It could be argued that even the specific scales on BRIEF-A assess functioning 
more broadly than the CWIT task. A number of variables, such as motivation, goals, 
and situational variables may contribute to performance in a real world environment, as 
pointed out by for example Chaytor et al., (2006). Items on the BRIEF-A Inhibit scale 
refer to phenomena such as decisions, distractions and impulsivity, which all involve 
interactions with the environment. Certain issues, such as “... trouble sitting still” (Roth 
et al., 2005) are mostly noticeable in environments that demand specific behaviors. 
Even if two individuals share a common cognitive deficit, this might therefore present 
itself differently depending on their environment, resources and personality 
characteristics. Different individuals may also utilize different compensatory 
mechanisms (Chaytor et al., 2006). Some of these, such as self-correction (Shuster & 




Toplak, 2009), may lead to slower reaction times on the CWIT but less apparent 
inhibition problems in daily life. Thus it is possible that the CWIT and BRIEF-A are 
sensitive to different manifestations of an inhibition deficit 
It might also be that the two meausres do not measure the same underlying 
cognitive mechanism. The validity of the inhibition construct is weakened if the 
operationalization if the term depends on tests that do not correlate with each other. The 
convergent validity of inhibition as measured by the different measures is debatable. 
The discriminant validity of inhibition is called into question by the fact that the CWIT 
measure of inhibition correlates more with general executive functions (GEC) than with 
the Inhibit scale. Rabbitt (2004) has asserted that much of the divergence in the 
executive function literature can be attributed to the fact that the study of executive 
functions try to describe these functions at more than one level at once. He further 
argues that the proposed components of executive functioning, including inhibition, are 
actually just “descriptions of task demands” (p.1), and that performance on various 
purported executive tasks may be excessively task-specific (Rabbitt, 2004). 
The fact that it was only the combined Inhibition/Switching (IS) condition that 
correlated with the GEC on BRIEF-A at a .01 level suggests that this condition might be 
more strongly related to the experience of executive function in daily life. The unique 
thing about this condition was the added demand of switching, or cognitive flexibility. 
As other measures of cognitive flexibility were not correlated significantly with 
depression in this sample (Schmid & Hammar, 2013a), it allows for the possibility that 
the higher difficulty or complexity of the task is the factor that makes it more sensitive 
to inhibition deficits than the pure inhibition condition (CW). As previously discussed, 
task characteristics such as complexity and novelty may be crucial when assessing 




executive functions (Goel et al., 1997; Levine et al., 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). A 
problem with this important aspect of the concept of executive functions is that novelty 
and complexity are task characteristics that would probably also be more sensitive to 
global reductions in processing efficiency (Rabbit, 2004). Based on the fact that 
performance on other tasks requiring effortful processing are intact, Hammar et al. have 
concluded that the observed impairments probably are not the result of higher demands. 
Schmid & Hammar (2013b) also ruled out processing speed as an explanation of the 
slower reaction times by subtracting the reaction times of the simple naming conditions 
from the inhibition scores (calculationg the contrast score). There may still be other 
variables that affect the performance on this measure preferentially, such as the ability 
to learn from the preceding CW condition (Lippa & Davis, 2010).  
It might also be the case that the mean performance on certain tests is not the 
most informative metric. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004), have suggested that variability in 
performance between trials and between different tasks are more informative about 
executive dysfunction than the group means for each trial or any specific task. They 
have proposed that variability in performance can be elicited by variations in the task 
characteristics; specifically whether features of the task encourage strategic attention to 
demanding task characteristics and therefore encourage goal activation (Nieuwenhuis et 
al. 2004). In other words, they propose a more general process rather than the operation 
of specific executive domains to explain variability in results (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2004). 
Another possibility is that instead of a different or more general mechanism, 
more specificity is needed. These findings are consistent with propositions that there are 
separate components of inhibition, allowing for the possibility that these two measures 
tap into different components of the same umbrella term as suggested by a number of 




previously discussed studies (Bull & Scerif, 2001; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Khng & 
Lee, 2009; Nigg, 2000). 
Relapse and No Relapse Groups 
No difference was found between those who had relapsed in the last year and 
those who hadn't, however it is important to note that the number of participants for 
which this data was presently available, was very low. With only seventeen cases, the 
analysis might lack the statistical power to justify rejecting the hypothesis that those 
who relapsed have more significant problems with self-reported inhibition. The median 
score of the relapse group was slightly (though not significantly) higher than the no 
relapse group, but the scores on inhibition were actually slightly (though not 
significantly) lower for the relapse group. A larger sample is needed to examine whether 
this reflects a real trend, or simply random variation as suggested by the present 
analysis. If it really is the case that CWIT is correlated with the risk of relapse, but not 
BRIEF-A, this is further reason to suggest there is some difference in the sensitivity of 
the measures or in the underlying process that is assessed. Knowing which measures of 
inhibition deficits are associated with risk of relapse could be valuable to developing 
screening tools aimed at identifying at-risk groups.  
Summary and Conclusions 
These results added to previous findings of persistent executive function 
impairments in first episode MDD by analyzing a self-report measure. Inhibition was of 
particular interest, as this was the executive deficit most strongly related to depression 
in previous studies (Schmid & Hammar, 2013a, 2013b). The relationship between the 
inhibition scores on CWIT and BRIEF-A is ambiguous.  




There was some congruence; both the CWIT and BRIEF-A inhibition scores 
seem to reveal relatively persistent and stable inhibition deficits, despite remission from 
MDD. Even though further analyses indicated a small significant decrease in the GEC 
score, especially for the patient group, this was apparently not the case for the Inhibit 
scale, suggesting its relative stability. The Inhibit scale was also not significantly 
correlated with concurrent depressive symptoms, and neither were the CWIT scores at 
T2 (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b) 
Despite this, the direct correlation between the two measures of inhibition was 
not significant. CWIT was furthermore related to the risk of relapse, whereas there was 
no indication that BRIEF-A was. The large variations in previous research, as well as 
the low correlation between BRIEF-A and CWIT in the current study raises questions 
about the construct validity of inhibition as defined by these two measures.  
Determining the cause of the discrepancy might provide valuable insights about 
cognitive funtioning in depression. Information about the patterns of impairment could 
perhaps be instrumental to expanding models of depression, or to identifying subgroups 
of MDD patients. 
Limitations 
A few methodological considerations impact the generalizability of these results. 
The inclusion criteria for participation were highly specific, with a relatively low age, 
no previous history of depression, outpatient status and little or no co-morbidity. While 
this is also one of the strengths of the study, the results may not extend to other groups. 
Some of the participants were receiving antidepressant medication and/or psychological 
treatment. Assessing the impact of these on BRIEF-A was beyond the scope of the 
present study, but CWIT scores did not appear to be affected by medication at follow-up 




(Schmid & Hammar, 2013b). The average IQs of the patient (M = 118.53) and control 
group (M = 120.97) as measured at T1 were quite high (Schmid & Hammar, 2013a). 
Low sample sizes may have contributed to falsely accepting null-hypotheses, 
particularly when comparing relapse groups. Low statistical power due to few 
participants may also be one of the reasons why only one correlation between BRIEF-A 
and CWIT reached significance.  
Random sampling was not possible for this study. The control group was 
matched on important characteristics, but it cannot be completely ruled out that there are 
confounding variables not accounted for. Testing was not blinded. 
It is not possible to draw conclusions about causality as it is a crossectional 
study. The results do suggest that the cognitive impairment is not the result of long-term 
depressive illness. In lieu of information about pre-morbid performance, however, it is 
not possible to establish whether poor executive functioning, including inhibition, 
contributed to the onset of depression, results from the first episode or is caused by 
other variables. The positive correlation of MADRS scores with the BRIEF-A, but not 
with CWIT, suggests that the former may be more closely linked to residual depressive 
symptoms. The causal direction of this relationship is not possible to determine based 
on the current study.  
It cannot yet be determined with certainty that the measured impairments on 
either measure really do reflect an underlying executive function or inhibition deficit in 
the way it has been described in common models. The fact that only two different tests 
of inhibition were analyzed limits any inferences about the underlying cognitive 
constructs. Although there seems to be a variable that is affecting task performance on 
the CWIT and executive function in daily life, it is still a matter of debate whether this 




best explained by general or specific processes. The inherent problems with measuring 
executive functions (e.g. Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Hughes & Graham, 2002; Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Stuss & Alexander, 2000) are relevant to the 
current study. The participants had been tested on the same task measures twice, 
although with one year in between sessions.  
Implications and Future Research 
The present findings corroborated previous results (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b) 
suggesting that the inhibition problems in first episode MDD persist despite remission 
from affective symptoms. This indicates the possibility of a trait-like vulnerability. 
Follow-up studies after more than one year could answer whether cognitive function is 
simply slower to normalize than affective symptoms, or if this impairment constitutes a 
more permanent trait. Prospective studies with participants that have not previously 
been depressed are needed in order to answer whether the deficit is present before the 
first episode, occurs simultaneously with, or is a consequence of this first episode.  
More research is needed to determine that the difference between control and 
patient groups on BRIEF-A scores after remission are, like the CWIT scores (Schmid & 
Hammar, 2013b), independent of the concurrent low-level depressive symptoms, as the 
current analysis suggests a link between the BRIEF-A and MADRS scores. Similarly, 
the work of ruling out other cognitive, affective and demographic third-variables 
requires replication studies with various samples.  
Correlations between the scale items and task performance were inconsistent, in 
line with some previous findings (Mcauley et al., 2010; Samyn et al., 2015; & Toplak et 
al., 2013), suggesting caution is needed when generalizing from performance on 
specific task measures to daily life, and when comparing studies that have utilized 




different forms of measurement. It could be that the two approaches are not 
interchangeable, but complimentary in capturing a broader picture of inhibition 
difficulties in MDD. More than one type of assessment may necessary to assess 
cognitive functions in depression, as suggested by Burgess (1998). Research with 
precisely defined populations and multiple types of measures could establish what 
impact specific deficits have on more general problem solving and daily situations.  
Conceptual and methodological issues relating to executive function 
measurement in general, such as poorly defined and divergent descriptions of the 
various processes, and variable approaches to measurement (Rabbitt, 2004), need to be 
resolved before any conclusions can be drawn about the underlying constructs measured 
by the CWIT and BRIEF-A in MDD. The relationship between BRIEF-A and 
informant-reports on BRIEF-A, as well as other scale measures and objective measures 
of inhibition performance could provide valuable information.  
It remains to be established whether various measures of inhibition are equally 
predictive of relapse. CWIT performance can be linked to the rate of relapse beyond 
what is explained by symptom severity (Schmid & Hammar, 2013b), but the present 
analyses could not determine reliably whether this was the case for BRIEF-A. Highly 
specific populations and thorough assessment of possible confounding variables are 
probably necessary in order to establish specific relationships between cognitive 
function measures and clinical features such as the risk of relapse.  
Future studies may also reveal whether the pattern of impairment is specific to 
MDD. Multiple studies using various precisely defined populations could establish the 
specificity of this impairment. Research with other populations could furthermore 
decide if inhibition deficits are present for most of those who become depressed; or only 




for some, as suggested by McIntyre et al. (2013). It could be that this impairment is 
associated with more severe subtypes of depression, or that it only constitutes a 
predisposition to depression in combination with other variables.  
Determining whether there is a link between cognitive inhibition and 
vulnerability to depression is only the first step to developing interventions. If future 
research shows further support for a statistically and clinically significant effect of 
inhibition in predicting depressive episodes, the reasons for this need to be explored. 
Cognitive inhibition may impact mood and or general functioning directly (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010), but it could also be symptomatic of more severe depression subtypes, 
or of more important cognitive, clinical or environmental characteristics. If inhibition 
does have a causal role, the mechanisms though which this occurs, whether by affecting 
regulation of emotions, thoughts or behavior; or the ability to perform daily tasks, need 
to be described. Research on specific interventions is needed to test whether the 
impairment, or its effects on disability and the chance of experiencing depressive 
episodes, can be ameliorated. In addition to extending theories of cognitive impairment 
and developing targeted treatments, describing the patterns of impairment also has a 
more immediate application; if there are more chronic subtypes of depression associated 
with cognitive impairment, or certain groups that are at risk due to reduced cognitive 
performance, measures of cognitive functions could constitute a helpful tool in 
identifying these. Early interventions might then be developed with the aim of 
improving long-term outcomes and psychosocial functioning.  
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